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Abstract
The present paper uses business process benchmarking to compare the German and Hungarian railway
reform and benchmarking of the effects on main business goals to evaluate the efficiency of the
government contributions in the railway sector.
Keywords: benchmarking, railway reform, government contribution.
1. Introduction
Governments grant considerable financial resources to subsidy railway services in
every European country. All of them try to use the taxpayer’s money as effectively
as possible, therefore the analysis of expenses to the railway sector is actual. Bench-
marking was chosen for this purpose. Following the principles of Business Process
Benchmarking – handled by R. C. Camp – two alternative methods are available
[1]:
• Process benchmarking is to discover the similar processes, which are com-
parable with each other. For this purpose the German and the Hungarian
railway reforms are to be analysed between 1993–2002, starting from the
objectives and evaluating the issues.
• The basis of the benchmarking should be the effect on the main goals instead
of performance and process. In this context the subvention paid for a railway
transport unit will be compared in some European countries.
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2. Process Analysis: Railway Reform
The German railway reformwas preferred like best practice for the business process
benchmarking. The first year of the examination is 1993, since the first step of the
railway reform in Germany was taken effect in 1994. In Hungary the decrease of
the transport demand terminated before this date, the railway act came into force
also in 1993. The length of the period analysed is 10 years.
2.1. Objectives and Political Measures
The German railway reform had two basic objectives [2]:
• to increase the transport performance of the railways,
• to reduce the government expenditure.
To meet the targets the following measures were taken into account:
• organisational restructuring of the GermanNational Railway Company (DB).
• to split the public functions between the federal and the regional governments.
• to introduce market competition in the railway transport.
• harmonization of the rules of competition between the different modes of
transport.
To ensure the legal background the constitution was amended, five new acts
were adopted and 130 regulations were modified.
As far as the Hungarian railway reform was concerned, two main political
objectives could be followed up:
• to adopt the European legislations,
• to reduce the government expenditure.
In the period discussed several government decrees were issued, which had
some identical measures:
1. Increase the efficiency of the MÁV company, i.e.:
(a) to write off the old debts (to assume them by the state),
(b) to reduce the number of employees.
2. Rationalization of the network.
There was not declared any need for increase of the transport supply, as most
of the decrees contained measures for reducing the network, and at the same time
all official forecasts predicted a decrease in the railway transport. As rationalization
faced the resistance of the citizens based on real or thought interests, the railway
services were terminated only on a five km long section. Furthermore, on a 141 km
long section the railway passenger service was replaced by coaches, which is still
operated by the Railway Company.
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Different decisions aimed at the structural transformation of MÁV, but finally
the integrated company form still exists due to the high transformation cost. The
internal structure of the company followed step by step the European organizational,
administrational and accounting models, its detailed configuration was mainly the
responsibility of the management [3]. After clearing the activity-portfolio and
fulfilling the employment reducing requirements 100 subsidiaries were established.
In the analysed period one new act was adopted and 12 decrees were issued
or modified [4]. In the sensitive political period the government’s aim was to fulfil
the European requirements on a minimum level, that means, it preferred as few
legislations to be changed as possible to avoid political debates. As far as railway
liberalization is concerned the fundamental EU requirements were adopted in the
national law, but no further steps were taken to exploit the railway’s economical
benefits. The management of the MÁV forwarded the requirements of increasing
the efficiency (cutting the costs) in the same form and size to the business units, and
this lawn-mower principle did not encourage the technology and business process
development.
2.2. The Effect of the Reforms on the Transport Performances
In the case of Germany the decreasing of the railway passenger services stopped,
market share of the railway started to grow in the analysed period. The basis of the
growth was the regional passenger transport. The performance of freight increased
after a long stagnation period; although its growth rate could not reach that of the
road transport [5].
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Freight transport in Germany
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In the case of Hungary the dramatic fall in the transport demand stopped after
the political change, in the middle of the analysed 10 years period a slight increase
began in the passenger transport. The railway freight transport was not able to
increase the volume, therefore its market share is decreasing [6].
Passenger transport in Hungary
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Freight transport in Hungary
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2.3. The Effect of the Reforms on the Budget
Simultaneously with the reform conception in Germany; the forecasted government
expenditure was calculated without the effects of the reforms and the expected
savings due to the reforms. It is obvious that the effect on the budget exceeded the
expectations since the government spent less than foreseen for the subsidization
of DB. It can be seen that the budget had a large decision space every year, the
favourable figures were probably based on a small reduction of investment.
The Hungarian government expenditures tended upwards in current value; for
the sake of comparison the strongly variable inflation must be taken into account [7].
The expenses are calculated in real value regarding the year 2002. The presented
figures contain all government expenditures on the MÁV including the write off of
the debt. The trend of the figures shows that the expenditure kept the fluctuation
around a stable level, therefore its real value did not decrease.
2.4. Adaptation of the European Legislations
The railway reform in Hungary was successful in the legal aspect, as the chapter,
transport, of the negotiation of accession was managed to close before the end
of 2001, the legal harmonization was completed till the joining. The Hungarian
Government received a transitional period till December 2006 to introduce some
measures regarding liberalization.
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2.5. Summary of the Analysis
To make a benchmark between Hungary and Germany it must be taken into consid-
eration, that the economical potentials of Germany and Hungary are quite different.
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After all the motives of the German railway reform were two clear, well defined ob-
jectives, the measures needed to it were properly assigned. The reform in Hungary
seemed to follow the occurrences, themeasures of the reformdepended on the actual
political and economical possibilities, on the changes of the European legislation,
and many steps proved to be inconsistent or non executable. In the restructuring
plans it will be worth in the future to formulate the public needs regarding the
sustainable development, namely the preference of public transport modes.
3. Effect on the Main Goals: Efficiency of the Government Contributions
3.1. Forms of Public Budget Contribution in the European Countries
Public budget contributions to railway undertakings and infrastructure managers
are permitted by the EU legislation in various forms.
• Public Service Obligation (PSO) is a government requirement for an operator
to undertake services, often with tariff controls, which would not be operated
under the same conditions as if the operatorwere acting in its own commercial
interests. The framework of Public Service Obligations for transport services
was established in Council Regulation EEC/1191/69. In some countries the
freight transport (mainly combined) can also be a recipient of state support.
• State aid for the purpose of contributing to the financing of transport in-
frastructure is permitted under EU law. This is specified in Council Regula-
tion 1107/70. Different forms of state aid for infrastructure may occur. They
may be directed at operating costs for the management and maintenance of
infrastructure or take the form of capital grants for investing in infrastructure.
• Important categories of public budget contribution are specifically identified
in Council Regulation 1192/69 on common rules for the normalisation of
the accounts of railway undertakings. The principle behind this regulation is
that the railway organisation is required to bear greater operating costs than
it would be if it were operating on a commercial basis. Items specified in
this regulation include payments for retirement, and payments for backdated
government increases in wages and salaries.
• Article 9 of Council Directive 91/440 specifies forms of public budget con-
tributions which are permitted to reduce the indebtedness of the railway un-
dertaking. The objective of this provision is to reduce indebtedness of the
undertaking to such a level that it would not impede financial management
and to improve the financial situation of the undertaking.
• State Aid that is exceptional and is given in order to permit restructuring to
remove excess capacity is permitted by EU law. This is specified in Council
Regulation 1107/70. Such an aid may include, for example, payments for
redundancies.
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3.2. Benchmark Data
The countries presented below were selected according to the principle that they
should have similar dimensions like Hungary or some others having different orga-
nizational structure and financial background.
The figures regarding Hungary were based on data published in the MÁV
Statistical booklet, as state subvention aiming at the reduction of the indebtedness.
A yearly average of the subvention between 1998 and 2002 was taken into consid-
eration as an extraordinary income [8].
Table 1.
State contribution in 2001
million EUR
PT GB FR AT BE LU HU
1 Passenger public service 9 1 727 1 731 491 361 76 278
2 Freight/combined transport 0 57 76 140 0 0 0
3
Infrastructure maintenance
and operation
7 1 201 1 608 950 640 142 0
4 Investment 87 0 263 122 419 0 119
5
Personnel and retirement
expenses
0 0 2 131 0 520 0 0
6 Debt service 0 0 1 067 213 17 0 60
Total 103 2 985 6 876 1 916 1 957 218 457
Transport performance
(pkm+tkm) million
6172 58500 121605 25586 16211 974 14568
Payments per transport
unit, EUR
PT GB FR AT BE LU HU
Operation and
maintenance (1+2+3)
0.003 0.051 0.028 0.062 0.062 0.224 0.019
Investment (4) 0.014 0.000 0.002 0.005 0.026 0.000 0.008
Other payments (5+6) 0.000 0.000 0.026 0.008 0.033 0.000 0.004
Total 0.017 0.051 0.057 0.075 0.121 0.224 0.031
3.3. Summary of the Benchmark
The sum of payments per transport units show how much taxpayers money shall be
spent for producing a railway service unit. There are no unique evaluation methods
regarding financing, the influences are different in each country.
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Fig. 7.
To evaluate the domestic figures some aspects have to be taken into consid-
eration which affects the performance of the MÁV even if the financial data would
be the same:
• despite the ongoing restructuring process the productivity of MÁV is still
lower than the average of the European railway companies,
• the price of energy, materials and vehicles are the same as in Europe,
• due to the low passenger tariffs the own revenues of the company are also
low.
Under these circumstances it is necessary to observe, that the Hungarian
government has managed to keep the tariffs in low level while it could pay only
the 40–50% of the average European subvention level. The negative impact is the
permanent decreasing quality and the indebted company.
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